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1. Joseph Raz's novel, prescient, and richly multifaceted critique of 
egalitarianism builds on the notion of what he calls "ordinary" principles of 
entitlement to goods. He draws an exclusive distinction between such 
principles and those which he labels "strictly egalitarian". In the case of 
the latter, it "is the actually existing inequality of distribution which 
creates the entitlement. The entitlement is designed to eliminate a 
specific kind of existing inequality. Such principles reflect the view that it 
is wrong or unjust for some Fs to have G while others have not." By 
contrast, ordinary principles are "indifferent to the existing distribution of 
their benefits". If, for example, "the entitlement is based on need then 
each is entitled just to his needs. Unless the actual distribution of the 
benefit affects the nature or the extent of the need for it (which it may 
do) it is irrelevant to the right." (226)1 
 
The realization, however, of certain ordinary principles of entitlement, will 
tend, as a by-product, to increase the equality of a distribution. This holds 
for what Raz calls "satiable, diminishing principles of entitlement". A 
satiable principle is one whose "demands ... can be completely met" 
(235). A diminishing principle is one where "the more [of good] G an F 
has the weaker becomes the reason to give him more G" (236). 
 
Raz defends the claim "that there is no case for relying on egalitarian 
principles in combination with diminishing principles" (239). This is 
because it would be superfluous or redundant to regulate an ordinary, 
diminishing principle of entitlement by a strictly egalitarian principle. Raz 
writes: "Strict egalitarian principles cannot be applied to diminishing 
principles of entitlement, which already have distributive commitments 
built into them".2 The fact that a tendency towards equality is already 
built into such a principle is meant to provide an explanation of why there 
is no case for applying strict egalitarian principles to diminishing principles 
of entitlement.3 
 
                                   
* Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, 
London School of Economics. 
1 All such page references are to JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (Oxford University 
Press, 1986). Most of them are to Ch. 9 on "Equality". 
2 Oxford Scholarship Online abstract to Ch. 9. 
3 Raz elaborates on this point on pp. 239-40, to which I shall return later. 
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Only "non‐diminishing and insatiable principles" of entitlement to goods 
"can be sensibly regulated by an egalitarian principle" (235). An 
"insatiable principle is one which it is always possible in principle to satisfy 
to a higher degree" (236). A non-diminishing principle is one where the 
strength of a reason to give a person a unit of some good G does not vary 
depending on how many units of G he already has. 
 
Raz maintains that the "pursuit of pleasure is insatiable, and non-
diminishing" (241). The classical utilitarianism's commitment to 
maximizing net pleasure therefore provides an example of a non-
diminishing, insatiable principle. It follows that classical utilitarianism is 
indifferent to whether a unit of pleasure goes to someone who is very well 
off or very badly off. Hence "it tolerates extreme inequalities" (238). More 
generally, there is a prima facie case for the regulation of non‐diminishing 
and insatiable principles by strictly egalitarian principles. This is because 
such principles, when unregulated, imply an intuitively unacceptable 
indifference to the increasing of great inequality. 
 
Raz argues, however, that no sound principles of allocation are insatiable 
and non-diminishing: all such "insatiable non-diminishing principles are 
invalid" (p. 239) and any non-diminishing principle is "of doubtful 
significance to political morality".4 Rather, "any plausible principles of 
entitlement of a fundamental nature are satiable and diminishing" (241). 
 
Hence, there is no case for strictly egalitarian principles. 
 
2. In this paper, I shall argue that there is a sound case for the regulation 
of diminishing principles by strictly egalitarian principles. 
 
I begin with some observations about what it is for a principle of 
entitlement to be diminishing. The quantity of one quality can be 
diminishing only in the quantity of another quality. If we're measuring 
only a single quality – such as the amplitude (i.e., the distance from 
resting point to peak) of a seismic wave – that quality can be neither 
increasing nor decreasing in itself. Of course, the Richter scale is 
logarithmic. It is therefore increasing in a linear scale. But there is still a 
single quality, a seismic wave, the measure of whose amplitude is neither 
increasing nor decreasing in itself. Rather, the same quality might be 
measured by different scales, the one scale (e.g., the logarithmic scale) of 
which might be increasing in the other scale (e.g., the linear scale). In 
order, therefore, for there to be a diminishing principle of entitlement to 
some good, there must be a quantity of some quality that diminishes in a 
quantity of some other quality, as measured by the same type (e.g., 
linear) of scale. We need an x-axis and a y-axis. We can't just have a y-
axis, whose units might be either linear or logarithmic. 
 
                                   
4 Oxford Scholarship Online abstract to Ch. 9. 
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Consider the diminishing marginal utility of money. Quantities of money 
are cardinally represented by a linear scale on the x-axis and quantities of 
happiness (i.e., utility) by a linear scale on the y-axis. The relation 
between the two is represented by a familiar-looking increasing, concave-
downward-shaped curve. If one is a utilitarian of a fairly direct sort, then 
the strength of a person's entitlement to money will be represented by 
the utility-representing y-axis. This is because, for such a utilitarian, the 
strength of one's entitlement is simply the extent to which extra money 
enhances one's utility. Hence, the utilitarian's normative commitments 
transform the empirical fact of the diminishing marginal utility of money 
into a principle of entitlement. 
 
For a utilitarian, therefore, a principle of entitlement to money will be a 
diminishing principle. As in the case of all diminishing principles, its 
fulfilment will give rise, as a by-product, to greater equality in the 
distribution of the good to which people are entitled. This is because a 
transfer of a unit of the good (i.e., a dollar) from someone who is better 
off to someone who is worse off, and who remains worse off even after 
the transfer, will always increase utility. It will also, as a by-product, 
decrease the inequality in the distribution between the pairs of people. 
 
This example of a diminishing principle presents a challenge to Raz's 
claim that "there is no case for relying on egalitarian principles in 
combination with diminishing principles" (239). Raz maintains that there 
is no case because "diminishing principles lead to an approximately equal 
distribution in any case" (239). Hence, according to him, the regulation of 
a diminishing principle by a strictly egalitarian principle would "not affect 
the outcome" – it would not "affect the weight one would assign to 
different reasons, thus affecting the resulting distribution" (240). Raz 
expresses scepticism regarding the possibility that there is an "egalitarian 
principle at work" in regulating an ordinary diminishing principle of 
entitlement, where the existence of such an egalitarian principle "is 
merely masked by the fact that its results are the same as those of the 
underlying" ordinary diminishing entitlement principle. (239)  
 
The example of a classical utilitarian principle of diminishing entitlement 
to money shows, however, that it is not necessarily redundant to regulate 
a diminishing principle of entitlement by a strictly egalitarian principle. 
This is for the reason that egalitarians would maintain that the reduction 
of inequality that occurs as a by-product of the maximization of utility 
does not deliver all the equality there ought to be. There is a call to 
equalize the circumstances of individuals above and beyond the 
equalization of the distribution of money that maximizes utility. Hence the 
regulation of the utilitarian principle of entitlement to money by a strictly 
egalitarian principle does not redundantly leave the resulting distribution 
unchanged. Rather, it makes a positive difference in the direction of 
greater equality. 
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Raz in fact draws attention to the fact that it was a "reaction against the 
distributional consequences" of classical utilitarianism which "accounts for 
much of the appeal of strict egalitarianism. Those convinced of the 
soundness of classical utilitarianism in other respects felt that its one 
main failing is its disregard of the independent value of equality of net 
pleasure, and sought to supplement it with an egalitarian principle 
controlling the application of the basic utilitarian principle." (239) 
 
One general lesson we can draw from this discussion is that an ordinary 
diminishing principle of entitlement to a good will not necessarily capture 
all of our convictions as to how much equality there should be. Among 
other reasons why this is so, a diminishing principle might not diminish at 
a fast enough rate to deliver, as a by-product, all the equality we think 
there should be. This can be illustrated by a diminishing principle that 
diminishes very, very slowly, and perhaps only across a certain range. 
Such a principle would introduce hardly any tendency towards equality. 
We can see now that what's key to Raz's redundancy critique of 
egalitarianism is the existence of sound diminishing principles where the 
diminution is of a sufficiently high rate, across a sufficiently large range. 
 
3. From these observations, we can also show that the mere presence or 
absence of a point of satiation is not doing any direct work in Raz's 
argument against egalitarianism. 
 
A non-diminishing, insatiable principle of entitlement can be represented 
by a graph with the x-axis representing quantities of the good on a linear 
scale and the y-axis the strength of one's entitlement to the good on a 
linear scale. The graphic representation would be by a straight, upwardly 
sloping line, which begins at the origin and infinitely extends upward and 
rightward. We can transform such a principle into a satiable principle 
simply by introducing a point very far along this straight line, where it 
abruptly kinks into a horizontal line that extends infinitely to the right. 
This would be the point of satiation. The insatiable, non-diminishing 
principle will have been transformed, by this kink, not only into a satiable 
principle, but also into one that is diminishing at some point. Satiation is, 
after all, formally speaking, just an instance of diminution down from a 
positive marginal benefit to a zero marginal benefit. A satiable principle 
must be diminishing, at least at the limit. 
 
The introduction of a point of satiation, high up the line, wouldn't 
undermine the case for supplementation by an egalitarian principle. 
Suppose, for example, that a principle of entitlement to wealth is non-
diminishing from zero dollars to a trillion dollar, at which point in the 
monetary stratosphere satiation is deemed to occur. Such a satiable 
principle would nevertheless have the same "unacceptable consequences" 
in tolerating "extreme inequalities" that Raz identifies (see 238) in an 
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insatiable, non-diminishing principle of entitlement to wealth. Similarly, 
even if (contrary to Raz's belief) there were a high upper bound to 
pleasure, a point of satiation, classical utilitarianism would remain flawed 
below that bound, because it would remain indifferent to whether a unit of 
pleasure goes to someone below that boundary who has an enormous 
amount of pleasure or very little. 
 
On the other hand a principle that was always diminishing at a high rate, 
even if insatiable, would exhibit a strong tendency to realize equality 
across the range of possible distributions.5 Raz's charge of the 
superfluousness of layering on of a distinct, strictly egalitarian principle 
would have prima facie plausibility even in the case of such an insatiable 
principle that diminishes at a high rate. 
 
And, drawing on my earlier remarks, I would also maintain that, in the 
case of a principle that is diminishing and satiable, if the satiation is far 
enough distant, and the diminution is shallow enough, this would not be 
sufficient to establish even a prima facie case for the redundancy of its 
regulation by a strictly egalitarian principle. 
 
4. The fact that there is a call for more equality than the utilitarian 
principle of diminishing entitlement to money yields does not necessarily 
establish that the utilitarian principle stands in need of regulation by a 
strictly egalitarian principle. The following different, non-egalitarian 
response to this defect of classical utilitarianism is both possible and 
credible. One might insist that we need to apply a further ordinary 
diminishing principle of entitlement to the principle of diminishing 
marginal utility of money. Our entitlement to utility itself is captured by 
an ordinary diminishing principle. This is the now familiar principle of 
prioritarianism, made famous by Derek Parfit. This move is in fact 
anticipated by Raz in the last section of his chapter on equality, where he 
argues that the "pursuit of happiness is diminishing and satiable" (241). 
 
In order to represent such a diminishing principle, we transform the x-
axis of the earlier graph so that it represents quantities of happiness (i.e. 
utility) rather than money. As before, the y-axis represents the strength 
of our entitlement to happiness. The relation between x-axis happiness 
and y-axis entitlement to happiness is captured, once again, by a 
familiar-looking increasing, concave-downward-shaped curve. This curve 
now serves to represent a prioritarian's commitment to the diminishing 
marginal value of utility rather than, as in the case of the earlier graph, 
the diminishing marginal utility of money. 
 
                                   
5 It should be noted that a prioritarian transformation of utility is typically represented as 
yielding an insatiable because always increasing as well as diminishing principle of 
entitlement. I shall say more about prioritarianism in the next section. 
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If we plot a prioritarian principle of entitlement to money rather than 
utility, we will get an increasing, concave-downward-shaped curve that 
diminishes at a more rapid rate, since it will just be the further 
prioritarian concave transformation of the original concave curve that 
represents the diminishing marginal utility of money. On this graph, which 
combines the two previous graphs, the x-axis represents money and the 
y-axis represents prioritarian value. 
 
In light of the existence of a prioritarian alternative to equality, Raz could 
qualify his critique of egalitarianism by resting it on the less sweeping 
claim that there always exists a sound, ordinary diminishing principle of 
entitlement that will render redundant or superfluous any egalitarian 
principle that one might try to apply to the distribution of the same 
goods. This claim might be true even if, as I have been arguing, not every 
sound, ordinary diminishing principle crowds out egalitarian principles that 
apply to the distribution of the same goods. This more modest claim, if 
true, would be sufficient to crowd out all egalitarian principles and 
therefore vindicate Raz's critique of egalitarianism. 
 
One could, however, offer the following challenges to even this more 
modest claim. It remains open for an egalitarian to run the redundancy 
argument in the other direction. She could begin with the intuitive claim 
alluded to earlier that the principle of utility should be regulated by a 
strictly egalitarian principle. This is, for example, what Nagel proposed in 
his classic paper "Equality." Having done this, an egalitarian might then 
maintain that it would be redundant to introduce an ordinary, diminishing 
principle of entitlement to happiness, given that the non-diminishing 
utilitarian principle is already properly regulated by a strict egalitarian 
principle. Insofar as claims of redundancy are concerned, there appears to 
be a symmetry which creates a standoff between the egalitarian and the 
non-egalitarian. There is no obvious reason why the ordinary, diminishing 
principle must crowd out the egalitarian principle, rather than the other 
way around. 
 
We can also press the following, more fundamental question: How does 
one justify the claim that there are any sound, ordinary diminishing 
principles of entitlement that compete with egalitarian principles in the 
first place? How, for example, does one establish the existence of a 
diminishing ordinary entitlement principle of happiness? 
 
Raz offers the following suggestive remarks on behalf of the diminishing 
nature of happiness, which appeals to its satiability. He writes: 
 
The satiability of the principle helps to explain why the pursuit of 
happiness is a diminishing principle. It indicates that the happier a 
person's life is the nearer it is to a state beyond which it cannot 
improve, at least not in happiness. That helps explain, we vaguely 
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feel, why there is more reason to benefit those who are less happy 
than those who are more happy. In being further away from perfect 
happiness their lack is greater. (243) 
 
Does, however, our entitlement always diminish as we get closer to the 
realizable ideal of a satiable principle? One can think of cases in which the 
increments that are closer to the ideal appear to take on a greater 
importance. Consider the final steps to the summit of Everest. Those 
might be of far greater importance than the initial steps from base camp. 
Suppose now that, in the case of happiness, satiation consists of the 
attainment of the extinction of desire and contented bliss of nirvana. As in 
the case of Everest, the last few steps on the path to enlightenment might 
be of greater importance than the earlier steps of a novice at meditation.  
 
Given what I have just said, the case for diminution as one comes closer 
to the ideal might apply, not to satiable principles, but rather to insatiable 
principles of a particular sort: those which asymptotically converge on an 
upper bound, which might be understood as the ideal, which is never 
achievable. If further meditative steps were to take one closer and closer 
to nirvana, but one could never fully achieve, but only more closely 
approximate this state, the last steps might take on diminishing rather 
than increasing importance. This would be akin to a Mt. Everest to whose 
summit one could come closer and closer without ever reaching, as these 
steps have been etched into the stones by M. C. Escher. 
 
5. There is the following further difficulty in establishing the existence of 
diminishing principles. In order to establish whether a principle of 
entitlement to a good is diminishing or non-diminishing, one must be able 
to identify units of the good, where the measure of the unit is 
independent of the strength of the reason we have to give someone the 
good. If we don't have such an independent measure, then we will lack a 
quantity of some quality that diminishes in the quantity of some other 
quality, which, as I mentioned earlier, is a presupposition of a diminishing 
principle of entitlement. 
 
In the case of some goods, it is not difficult to identify such independently 
measurable units of the good. Money is perhaps the clearest example. 
The quantities of the unit of a dollar, for example, can simply be read off 
of the numbers printed on bank notes or statements. It is clear here that 
the measure of the unit is independent of the strength of the reason we 
have to give someone the good. A hundred dollar bill, for example, 
constitutes a hundred units of money, irrespective of to whomever it 
goes. Yet we have much stronger reason to give that bill to someone who 
is struggling to purchase groceries than to a billionaire. 
 
In the central case under discussion in this paper of a principle of 
entitlement to happiness, however, it will be far more difficult to identify 
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the unit in a manner that is independent of the strength of our 
entitlement to it. This is a point that John Broome has pressed against 
prioritarianism. He notes that prioritarianism depends on a "distinction 
between quantities of good and how much those quantities count", yet 
this distinction strikes him as "empty" where the good in question is well-
being.6 This holds true whether or not we conceive of well-being as 
encompassing a complex notion of happiness, in a manner that coheres 
with Raz's views, or as consisting of net pleasure, as classical utilitarians 
believe.  
 
Raz points to a diverse plurality of goods that typically constitute a 
person's well-being, when, for example, he writes: "Our notion of a 
successful life is of a life well spent, of a life of achievement, of handicaps 
overcome, talents wisely used, of good judgment in the conduct of one's 
affairs, of warm and trusting relations with family and friends, stormy and 
enthusiastic involvement with other people, many hours spent having fun 
in good company, and so on." (306) 
 
But, as James Griffin has argued elsewhere, there is no pre-existing, 
preference-independent common measure of such a plurality of different 
goods that contribute to a person's well-being.7 Griffin maintains that, in 
the face of such pluralism, a person's rational and informed preferences 
regarding different ways her life might go will typically be "quantitatively 
basic: that is, they are judgments that do not depend upon other 
judgments about the amount of some quantity each option has". Rather, 
these preferences themselves form the "raw materials" out of which "the 
construction of a scale of measurement of well-being begins".8  
 
Even if, rather than being pluralist about happiness, we are monist 
classical utilitarians of a Benthamite sort, according to which pleasure and 
the absence of pain are the only constituents of well-being, it remains 
unclear whether we can make sense of any independent units of amounts 
of pain or pleasure, to which to assign value that might diminish or 
increase. 
 
Whether or not, therefore, we are pluralists or monists about well-being, 
it appears that we must rely on preferences, of an idealized sort, to 
provide the measure of well-being.9 
 
                                   
6 JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS (Blackwell, 1991), p. 217. 
7 See JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING (Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 30–31. 
8 Ibid., p. 103. 
9 For further discussion and defence of the claims in this and the previous two 
paragraphs, see Michael Otsuka, Prioritarianism and the Measure of Utility, 23 JOURNAL OF 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (2015). Note that, as I mention there, a preference-based 
measure of utility does not imply the dubious claim that well-being is itself constituted 
by—or to be identified with the satisfaction of—preferences. 
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I shall therefore assume a measure of utility on which a prospect has 
higher expected utility for a person just in case it would be preferred for 
her sake after rational and calm deliberation with all pertinent information 
while attending only to that which falls within the scope of her own 
interests (rather than falling solely within the scope of the interests of 
others). One prospect has the same expected utility as another for a 
person just in case such deliberation would yield indifference between the 
two prospects. In other words, I shall assume a measure of utility that is 
derived from idealized preferences satisfying the Von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms.10 
 
6. With this assumption in place, I am now in a position to offer the 
following reply to Raz's argument against egalitarianism. This reply is 
analogous to an argument on behalf of equality that Alex Voorhoeve and I 
have pressed against Parfit's prioritarianism.11 In a nutshell, the argument 
is as follows: a strict egalitarian principle can be justified as tracking the 
difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal trade-offs. It makes 
an important moral difference whether two different people have 
competing claims on goods, or whether two possible futures of a single 
person have competing claims on goods. 
 
The argument can be illustrated in a manner that begins with a 
consideration of Thomas Nagel's well-known case involving the parent of 
two children. One of these children has recently been diagnosed with a 
condition that will soon give rise to a serious disability, but the other has 
been given a clean bill of health. You the parent need to choose whether 
to move your family to cramped urban accommodations or to the blue 
skies and open spaces of a semi-rural suburb. These two options would 
not be equally good for your two children. If you move to the city, your 
able-bodied child, who loves nature and sports, will be hemmed in and 
frustrated, but your (soon-to-be) disabled child will have access to special 
medical facilities. If you move to the suburb, your able-bodied child will 
flourish, but your disabled child will not receive this treatment. Moreover, 
if you move to the suburb, the boost in well-being to your able-bodied 
child will be slightly greater than the boost in well-being to your disabled 
child if you move to the city. 
 
On Raz's view, one ought to move to the city, since well-being involves an 
ordinary diminishing principle of entitlement. By contrast, a utilitarian, for 
                                   
10 In this paragraph, I draw on Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve, Equality versus 
Priority, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (Serena Olsaretti ed., forthcoming). 
11 In Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve, Why it Matters that Some are Worse Off than 
Others: An Argument Against the Priority View, 37 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 171, 
177n14 (2009), we maintain that "various other influential noncomparative, anti-
egalitarian views, such as those of Joseph Raz and Harry Frankfurt" are vulnerable to the 
critique that we press against Parfit's prioritarianism. In what follows, I try to make good 
on this claim. 
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whom well-being is non-diminishing, would maintain that one ought to 
move to the suburb. 
 
Now let us transform Nagel's two-child case into a case in which you have 
only a single child, who has an equal chance, so to speak, of turning out 
as either of Nagel's two children. In other words, suppose that you now 
have a single child, who has a 50% chance of developing the serious 
disability, and a 50% chance of being healthy. You must now decide 
whether to move to the city, where the child will receive special care if he 
turns out disabled, or to move to the suburb, where the child will flourish 
if he turns out healthy. As before, the benefit to the child of the suburb if 
healthy would be slightly greater than the benefit to him of the city if 
disabled. 
 
I have argued that, in this one-child case, it is reasonable to maximize 
the child's expected utility. Hence it is permissible to move to the suburb. 
This is for the following reason: 
 
Even if one maintains, as I do, that there are objective prudential 
goods, one should also maintain that ideally rational self-interested 
preferences will provide the measure of a person's well-being. 
Moreover, such preferences, being ideally rational, will conform to 
sound axioms of expected utility theory. It follows that ... you are 
permitted to maximize your child's expected utility in this one-child 
case on grounds that this is what it would be rational for him to 
prefer, taking all relevant normative considerations into account.12 
 
In the two-child case, by contrast, one ought to move to the city. I 
maintain that: 
 
This contrast, between the one-child and the two-child case, is 
explained by the fact that it matters whether or not there are others 
with competing claims to benefit. In the two-child case, one can ask 
the following rhetorical question: 'How can one justify providing a 
benefit of a given size to someone who is already better off in order 
to make him better off still, when one could instead provide nearly 
as large a benefit to someone else who is worse off, and who would 
not even reach the (unimproved) level of the better off person if she 
(the worse off person) is benefited?' An analogous complaint cannot 
be formulated against the maximization of expected utility in the 
one-child case.13  
 
By contrast, someone such as Raz, who affirms the validity only of 
ordinary diminishing (and not also of strictly egalitarian) principles of 
entitlement, will be unable to distinguish the one-child from the two-child 
                                   
12 Otsuka, "Prioritarianism and the Measure of Utility", supra note 10, at 5. 
13 Id. at 20n55. 
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case in the manner I have described.14 Such an inability reveals an 
insensitivity to the moral significance of the separateness of persons. In 
Ch. 11 on "Consequentialism" of The Morality of Freedom, Raz attempts 
to defend consequentialists against this particular charge. He writes: 
 
It is said that [consequentialism] equates a trade‐off by giving a 
good to one person at the cost of depriving the same person of 
another good (e.g. he will get a refrigerator, but will lose his TV), 
with taking a good from one person in order to give it to another 
(taking one person's TV in order to give a refrigerator to another), 
without noticing that in the second case we trade across the 
boundaries between people. These boundaries, so the claim goes, 
drop out of the consequentialist reckoning. (272) 
 
Raz offers the following response to this charge: 
 
To this the consequentialist can reply with justice that the fact that 
trade‐offs are between persons is taken into account. …In 
comparing the value of a refrigerator and of a TV to one person one 
takes his situation into account. Hence the comparison is mindful of 
the fact that either way he will have something. When judging the 
value of the goods to two people one determines the value of each 
of the goods to each person in light of that person's general 
situation. In their case it is a choice between something and 
nothing, and this would affect the consequences of the reallocation 
to them. So the fact that the trade‐off is across personal boundaries 
is reflected in the way that the value of the goods is judged in the 
second example. (ibid.) 
 
Here Raz provides a sound response to the particular case under 
discussion, which involves intra-personal versus inter-personal trade-offs 
under conditions of certainty. Other cases can be constructed, however, 
which demonstrate the failure of consequentialism to properly distinguish 
intra-personal versus inter-personal trade-offs. My contrasting cases of 
two children, one unhealthy and the other healthy, whose fates are 
certain versus a single child who has a 50-50 chance of being unhealthy 
or healthy, provides just such a demonstration. This is because, unlike 
Raz's cases involving refrigerators and televisions, in my cases, the 
baselines from which benefits arise are equalized across the intrapersonal 
and the interpersonal scenarios. Moreover, as I have shown earlier, it is 
not just consequentialism, but also Raz's embrace of ordinary diminishing 
principles of entitlement alongside his rejection of strictly egalitarian 
principles, which can be shown by such a pair of cases to demonstrate 
inadequate regard for the moral significance of the separateness of 
persons. 
                                   
14 See id. at 1-22 for a further defence of this claim. 
